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Abstract.	The	received	view	in	physicalist	philosophy	of	mind	assumes	that	causation	can	only	take	place	at	the	physical	domain	and	that	the	physical	domain	is	causally	closed.	It	is	often	thought	that	this	leaves	no	room	for	mental	states	qua	mental	to	have	a	causal	influence	upon	the	physical	domain,	leading	to	epiphenomenalism	and	the	problem	of	mental	causation.		However,	in	recent	philosophy	of	causation	there	has	been	growing	interest	in	a	line	of	thought	that	can	be	called	causal	anti-fundamentalism:	causal	notions	cannot	play	a	role	in	physics,	because	the	fundamental	laws	of	physics	are	radically	different	from	causal	laws.		Causal	anti-fundamentalism	seems	to	challenge	the	received	view	in	physicalist	philosophy	of	mind	and	thus	raises	the	possibility	of	there	being	genuine	mental	causation	after	all.		This	paper	argues	that	while	causal	anti-fundamentalism	provides	a	possible	route	to	mental	causation,	we	have	reasons	to	think	that	it	is	incorrect.		Does	this	mean	that	we	have	to	accept	the	received	view	and	give	up	the	hope	of	genuine	mental	causation?	I	will	suggest	that	the	ontological	interpretation	of	quantum	theory	provides	us	both	with	a	view	about	the	nature	of	causality	in	fundamental	physics,	as	well	as	a	view	how	genuine	mental	causation	can	be	compatible	with	our	fundamental	(quantum)	physical	ontology.	
	
1.	Introduction			The	received	view	in	physicalist	philosophy	of	mind	states	that	causation	can	only	take	place	at	the	physical	level	because	everything	that	happens	in	the	world	is	ultimately	determined	by	the	laws	of	physics	and	the	physical	domain	is	causally	closed	(cf.	Sundström	and	Vassen	2017).		This	implies	that	non-physical	entities	cannot	have	any	physical	effects.	If	mind	(whether	conscious	or	unconscious)	is	taken	to	be	non-physical	(as	is	often	done),	then	it	cannot	have	any	physical	effects,	and	we	end	up	with	epiphenomenalism,	the	view	that	mental	properties	exist	but	have	no	causal	influence	upon	the	physical	world.	
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Epiphenomenalism	is	widely	thought	to	be	an	unsatisfactory	view	and	there	have	been	many	attempts	to	avoid	it	(see	Robb	and	Heil	2018).	In	this	paper	I	will	discuss	two	ways	to	challenge	the	received	view,	and	to	save	mental	causation.				The	first	is	provided	by	causal	anti-fundamentalism,	a	view	which	states	that	causation	is	not	part	of	the	fundamental	physical	ontology	of	the	world.		If	causal	anti-fundamentalism	is	correct,	then	the	received	view	is	mistaken.	Moreover,	it	has	been	suggested	that	causal	anti-fundamentalism	is	compatible	with	the	idea	that	fundamental	physical	facts	ground	higher-level	causal	facts,	including	those	involving	consciousness	(Blanchard	2016:	256).	Conscious	experiences	could	then	be	seen	as	local	events	which	determine	events	in	their	future.	A	second	way	to	challenge	the	received	view	is	opened	up	by	the	ontological	interpretation	of	quantum	theory	(Bohm	and	Hiley	1987,	1993).	This	interpretation	suggests	that	the	wave	function	in	quantum	theory	describes	a	new	type	field	which	contains	active	information,	which	latter	is	a	fundamental,	causal	factor	organizing	the	motion	of	physical	particles.	Bohm	(1990)	proposed	that	by	extending	this	quantum	ontology	in	a	natural	way	one	can	show	how	mental	properties	can	influence	matter.	If	Bohm’s	proposal	is	correct	the	received	view	is	either	mistaken,	or	else	the	concept	“physical”	in	the	received	view	needs	to	be	extended	to	include	active	information	and	possibly	mind/consciousness	(which	are	traditionally	often	taken	to	be	non-physical	entities).	
	
2.	Causal	anti-fundamentalism		Philosophers	of	mind	and	neuroscientists	typically	assume	that	we	have	a	clear	understanding	of	the	nature	of	causality	in	the	physical	domain.	But,	in	fact,	there	is	a	venerable	tradition,	dating	back	to	Russell’s	(1913)	causal	anti-fundamentalism,	arguing	that	causal	notions	can	play	no	legitimate	role	in	how	physics	represents	the	world	(Frisch	2012;	Price	and	Corry	eds.	2007).		Causal	anti-fundamentalism	has	been	succinctly	summarized	in	a	recent	workshop	description	by	Sundström	and	Vassen	(2017):	
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	 …causal	notions	cannot	play	a	role	in	physics,	because	the	fundamental	laws	of	physics	are	radically	different	from	causal	laws.	Causal	laws	typically	describe	how	local	events	determine	events	in	their	future;	for	example,	a	causal	law	can	connect	smoking	to	later	occurrences	of	cancer.	By	contrast,	physical	laws	connect	the	entirety	of	physical	reality	in	a	time-symmetric	manner:	the	entire	state	of	the	universe	at	a	certain	time	equally	determines	the	relative	past	and	the	future	of	the	universe.	It	therefore	appears	reasonable	to	situate	causation	in	the	higher	levels	of	science	where	local	events	are	studied	in	a	time-directed	manner,	such	as	biology	and	economy.			So,	causal	anti-fundamentalism	is	the	thesis	that	causation	is	not	part	of	the	fundamental	physical	ontology	of	the	world.		If	true,	this	entails	that	causation	is	not	as	central	a	feature	of	the	world	as	ordinarily	thought.		But	as	was	noted	above,	it	has	been	suggested	that	causal	anti-fundamentalism	is	compatible	with	the	existence	of	causal	facts	as	non-fundamental	features	of	the	world	grounded	in	fundamental	physical	facts	(Blanchard	2016:	256;	cf.	Cartwright	1979).	I	suggest	that	causal	facts	involving	conscious	experiences	can	also	be	seen	as	such	features.	This	suggests	a	view	in	which	conscious	experiences	can	be	seen	as	local	events	which	determine	events	in	their	future	(in	a	similar	manner	as	with	causal	laws	in	special	sciences	such	as	biology	and	economy).	Physics	(and	the	causal	closure	of	the	physical	domain)	would	no	longer	be	an	obstacle	to	mental	causation.	On	the	contrary:	fundamental	physical	facts	would	now	ground	the	causal	facts	involving	conscious	experiences!1	Let	us	summarize	our	discussion	so	far.	According	to	the	received	physicalist	view	there	is	no	room	for	mental	causation,	because	all	goings	on	in	the	world	are	ultimately	determined	by	physics	and	physics	itself	is	causally	closed.	In	contrast,	according	to	the	view	inspired	by	causal	anti-fundamentalism	the	physical	world	is	not	governed	by	any	fundamental	relation	of	cause	and	effect.	
																																																								1	Metaphysical	grounding	is,	of	course,	a	subtle	topic	in	contemporary	metaphysics,	and	we	will	not	here	enter	into	a	discussion	about	what	exactly	it	might	mean	when	one	says	that	fundamental	physical	facts	ground	causal	facts.		But	see	Bliss	and	Trogdon	2016.	An	additional	challenge	is	to	spell	out	how	physical	facts	could	ground	non-physical,	conscious	facts	(thanks	to	Tuomas	Tahko	for	pointing	out	this	challenge).		
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But	one	can	still	hold	that	fundamental	physical	facts	ground	higher-level	causal	facts,	including	those	involving	consciousness.	Conscious	experiences	can	then	be	seen	as	local	events	which	determine	events	in	their	future.	Mental	causation	is	possible!	Is	this	too	good	to	be	true?	It	is	true	that	causal	anti-fundamentalism,	when	suitably	interpreted,	gives	us	mental	causation	in	some	sense.	But	it	also	implies	that	causal	facts	(including	those	involving	conscious	experiences)	are	non-fundamental.	One	might	worry	whether	this	is	too	deflationist	a	view	of	(mental)	causation.	Also,	causal	anti-fundamentalism	is	admittedly	weird,	given	the	way	we	have	traditionally	been	thinking	about	the	laws	of	physics.		Is	it	really	the	case	that	the	physical	world	is	not	governed	by	any	fundamental	relation	of	cause	and	effect?		
3.	Is	causal	anti-fundamentalism	correct?		Remember	that	causal	anti-fundamentalism	claims	that	the	fundamental	laws	of	physics	are	radically	different	from	causal	laws.	Allegedly,	one	important	difference	is	that	while	causal	laws	typically	describe	how	local	events	determine	events	in	their	future,	physical	laws	connect	the	entirety	of	physical	reality.	But	do	physical	laws	really	connect	the	entirety	of	physical	reality?	In	the	spirit	of	scientific	metaphysics,	let	us	here	consider	how	a	physicist	might	answer	the	question.	When	discussing	causality	and	chance	in	modern	physics	David	Bohm	proposed	in	1957	that	there	is	no	known	fundamental	physical	law	that	would	be	able	to	take	into	account	the	complete	state	of	the	world:		 …every	real	causal	relationship,	which	necessarily	operates	in	a	finite	context,	has	been	found	to	be	subject	to	contingencies	arising	outside	the	context	in	question.	(1957/1984:	3)			If	Bohm	is	correct,	perhaps	the	fundamental	laws	of	physics	are	not	radically	different	from	causal	laws,	and	there	is	causation	in	fundamental	physics	after	all	(for	a	brief	discussion	of	Bohm’s	view,	see	Andersen	et	al.	2018).	
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What	about	time-symmetry?	Another	reason	why	causal	anti-fundamentalism	claims	that	the	fundamental	laws	of	physics	are	radically	different	from	causal	laws	has	to	do	with	time-symmetry.	Causal	laws	typically	describe	how	local	events	determine	events	in	their	future.	But	physical	laws	connect	the	entirety	of	physical	reality	in	a	time-symmetric	manner.	The	idea	is	that	the	entire	state	of	the	universe	at	a	certain	time	equally	determines	the	relative	past	and	the	future	of	the	universe.		Let	as	again	consider	the	issue	in	the	light	of	Bohm’s	thinking	about	physics.	When	Bohm	in	his	1951	text-book	Quantum	theory	discusses	time-symmetry	he	notes	that	classical	theory	is	prescriptive	and	not	causal.	He	points	out,	consistently	with	causal	anti-fundamentalism,	that	in	classical	physics	the	idea	of	forces	as	causes	of	events	became	unnecessary	and	almost	meaningless.		[this	is	so]	because	both	the	past	and	the	future	of	the	entire	system	are	determined	completely	by	the	equations	of	motion	of	all	the	particles,	coupled	with	their	positions	and	velocities	at	any	one	instant	of	time.	Thus,	we	can	no	more	say	that	the	future	is	caused	by	the	past	than	we	can	say	that	the	past	is	caused	by	the	future.	Instead,	we	say	that	the	motion	of	all	particles	in	space	and	time	is	prescribed	by	a	set	of	rules,	i.e.	the	differential	equations	of	motion,	which	involve	only	these	space-time	motions	alone.	(1951:	151)		But	what	about	the	quantum	theory?		Here	Bohm	makes	a	point	which	seems	to	challenge	causal	anti-fundamentalism	in	a	profound	way:		 Whereas	classical	theory	can	be	expressed	in	terms	of	a	set	of	prescriptive	rules	relating	space-time	motions	at	different	times,	quantum	theory	cannot	be	so	
expressed.	Energy	and	momentum	(and	therefore,	the	causal	factors)	cannot	be	eliminated	in	terms	of	velocities	and	positions	of	the	component	particles.	The	quantum	theoretical	concept	of	causality,	therefore,	differs	from	its	classical	counterpart.	It	must	necessarily	describe	the	relationships	between	space-time	events	as	being	“caused”	by	factors	existing	within	matter	(i.e.,	momenta).	These	are	on	the	same	fundamental	and	not	further	analyzable	footing	as	that	of	space	and	time	themselves.	(1951:	157)	
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Bohm	acknowledges	that	in	quantum	theory	these	causal	factors	control	only	a	statistical	trend	in	the	course	of	space-time	events.	But	he	notes	further	that	it	is	
just	this	property	of	incomplete	determinism	that	prevents	the	causal	factors	from	
becoming	redundant.	This,	he	says,	gives	a	real	content	to	the	concept	of	causality	in	quantum	theory.	So,	if	Bohm	is	correct,	causal	anti-fundamentalism	is	incorrect	and	there	is	causation	in	the	physical	world.		This	so,	first	of	all,	because	each	known	fundamental	physical	law	operates	in	a	finite	context,	and	secondly	because	in	quantum	theory,	energy	and	momentum	(and	therefore,	the	causal	factors)	cannot	be	eliminated	in	terms	of	velocities	and	positions	of	the	component	particles	(unlike	in	Newtonian	physics).	Note,	however,	that	what	we	have	just	reported	above	comes	from	Bohm’s	1951	textbook	Quantum	theory	where	he	was	trying	to	explicate	a	version	of	the	usual,	“Copenhagen”	interpretation	(his	explication	is	fairly	similar	to	the	approach	of	Wolfgang	Pauli).	But	as	is	well	known,	Bohm	himself	published	an	alternative	interpretation	of	quantum	theory	in	1952.	This	interpretation	(or	“the	Bohm	theory”)	assumed	that	an	electron	has	simultaneously	a	well-defined	position	and	velocity	and	is	guided	by	a	new	type	of	field	(mathematically	described	by	the	wave	function	Ψ).		According	to	the	usual	interpretation	of	quantum	theory,	the	wave	function	Ψ	does	not	describe	an	individual	quantum	system	directly.	Rather,	Ψ	describes	our	knowledge	of	the	quantum	system	to	be	observed	(typically	in	terms	of	probabilities).	In	contrast,	according	to	Bohm’s	1952	theory,	Ψ	describes	an	objectively	real	field,	guiding	a	particle	such	as	an	electron.	What	is	the	role	of	causality	in	the	Bohm	theory?	A	minimalist	version	of	the	theory	(called	“Bohmian	mechanics”)	expresses	quantum	theory	as	a	“first-order”	theory	in	terms	of	velocities	(see	Goldstein	2013).		As	far	as	I	can	judge,	this	is	similar	to	classical	physics	in	that	causality	(energy,	momentum)	can	be	eliminated	if	one	wishes.		In	some	versions	of	Bohmian	mechanics	the	wave	function	is	assumed	to	be	law-like.	So	it	seems	that	causality	can	be	eliminated	just	as	in	classical	physics!2	However,	Bohm	and	Hiley	developed	Bohm’s	1952																																																									2	As	I	am	not	a	physicist,	I	offer	these	proposals	tentatively,	to	be	discussed	in	more	detail	by	those	physicists	specialized	in	Bohmian	mechanics.	
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theory	into	another	direction	(“the	ontological	interpretation”),	where	the	role	of	the	so	called	quantum	potential	energy	is	important.		In	this	picture	it	may	be	possible	to	retain	energy	as	irreducible	and	thus	“genuine”	causality	in	quantum	mechanics.3		The	above	suggests	that	there	are	certain	ironies	in	the	question	quantum	theory	and	causality.		It	seems	that	the	usual	interpretation	of	quantum	theory	implies	that	(statistical)	causality	is	irreducible,	ironically,	because	of	the	uncertainty	principle.	However,	recent	developments	in	the	interpretation	of	quantum	theory	(e.g.	Bohmian	mechanics)	may	eliminate	causality	from	fundamental	physics	(ironically,	because	of	determinism,	just	as	happened	in	Newtonian	physics).		But	there	is	the	possibility	that	in	Bohm	and	Hiley’s	ontological	interpretation,	with	its	emphasis	on	quantum	potential	energy,	we	can	retain	genuine	causality.	Let	us	now	return	to	the	issue	of	mental	causation.		We	have	noted	that	if	Bohm	and	Hiley’s	interpretation	is	correct,	and	includes	an	irreducible	form	of	quantum	potential	energy,	then	there	is	causation	in	the	fundamental	physical	level	and	causal	anti-fundamentalism	is	incorrect.		But	how	can	we	then	have	mental	causation?	Doesn’t	the	principle	of	the	causal	closure	of	the	physical	domain	apply	to	the	Bohm-Hiley	scheme	as	well,	thus	leaving	no	room	for	mental	properties	qua	mental	to	have	an	effect	upon	the	physical?	Here	I	suggest	that	we	consider	Bohm	and	Hiley’s	(1993)	suggestion	that	the	ontological	interpretation	can	be	extended.		So	let	us	move	on	to	examine	the	ontological	interpretation	and	the	way	its	extension	might	allow	for	mental	causation.			
4.	Extending	the	ontological	interpretation	of	quantum	theory		According	to	the	ontological	interpretation	of	quantum	theory	quantum	processes	are	guided	by	a	field	containing	active	information	(described	by	the	wave	function	Ψ,	expressed	in	terms	of	the	quantum	potential).	This	involves	a																																																									3	Again,	I	am	offering	this	proposal	tentatively	as	a	philosopher,	to	be	discussed	in	more	detail	by	physicists.	
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new	type	of	causation	which	we	may	call	informational	causation.	This	information	is	radically	holistic	–	it	enables	non-locality	and	irreducible	objective	wholeness	of	a	many-body	system.			It	is	important	to	realize	that	Bohmian	active	information	is	not	Shannon	information.		The	idea	is	that	the	form	of	the	quantum	field	(described	by	the	wave	function)	enfolds	information	about	the	environment	(e.g.	slits),	and	this	information	then	literally	IN-FORMS	the	movement	of	the	particle	through	the	quantum	potential.		The	information	is	potentially	active	everywhere	where	the	quantum	potential	non-zero,	but	actually	active	only	where	the	particle	is.		Without	such	actual	activity	of	"in-forming"	the	information	would	have	no	causal	powers.		So	in	this	picture	there	needs	to	be	actually	active	information	for	there	to	be	any	causally	efficacious	information	at	all.	Bohm	himself	(1990)	proposed	that	active	information	can	be	seen	as	a	“primitive	mind-like	quality”	of	elementary	particles,	suggesting	a	view	that	we	may	call	Bohmian	panprotopsychism	(see	Pylkkänen,	forthcoming).		The	key	principle	here	is	that	mental	processes	involve	"activity	of	form"	rather	than	"activity	of	substance".	When	you	read	the	newspaper,	you	do	not	need	to	eat	the	paper,	you	abstract	the	form	that	is	carried	or	enfolded	in	the	movement	of	light	waves.		That	form,	when	taken	up	by	the	nervous	system	and	interpreted	can	give	rise	to	a	conscious	experience	of	meaning	of	the	information.		Analogously,	the	electron	is	not	pushed	and	pulled	by	the	quantum	wave.		Rather,	it	is	able	to	respond	to	the	form	of	the	quantum	wave.		It	is	"mind-like"	in	this	sense.		Note	that	Bohm	thought	it	obvious	that	an	electron	is	not	(phenomenally)	conscious	(Bohm	1990).		But	we	could	ask	whether	the	electron	is	in	some	sense	"perceiving"	(unconsciously)	its	environment	via	the	quantum	field.		While	many	are	still	likely	to	see	pan(proto)psychism	as	“a	complete	myth,	a	comforting	piece	of	utter	balderdash”	(McGinn	2006:	93),	it	has	become	a	subject	of	intense	discussion	in	contemporary	philosophy	(see	Strawson	2006;	Goff	et	al.	2017;	Pylkkänen,	forthcoming).	How	does	mental	causation	work	in	Bohmian	quantum	ontology?	Bohm	suggested	that	it	is	natural	to	extend	the	quantum	ontology.	Just	as	there	is	a	quantum	field	that	informs	the	particle,	there	can	be	a	super-quantum	field	that	informs	the	first	order	quantum	field,	and	so	on	(Bohm	and	Hiley	1993:	379–
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381).	Let	us	further	assume	that	the	information	contained	in	our	mental	states	is	a	certain	part	of	this	hierarchy	of	fields.	Through	the	hierarchy,	mental	states	could	then	guide	material	processes,	by	reaching	the	quantum	field	of	the	particles	and	fields	in	the	brain	(Bohm	1990).	How	exactly	might	such	”quantum	mental	causation”	work?	There	are	currently	a	number	of	different	proposals	regarding	how	quantum	effects	might	play	a	role	in	the	neurophysiological	processes	underlying	cognition	and	even	consciousness	(see	Atmanspacher	2015;	Pylkkänen	2018).		From	the	perspective	of	the	ontological	interpretation	the	important	question	is	whether	there	are	some	“quantum	sites”	in	the	brain	where	the	quantum	potential	can	have	a	non-negligible	effect.		Hiley	and	Pylkkänen	(2005)	discuss	one	such	possibility	by	applying	the	quantum	potential	approach	to	Beck	and	Eccles’s	(1992)	ideas	about	the	role	of	quantum	mechanics	in	synaptic	exocytosis.			Beck	and	Eccles	suggested	that	the	appearance	of	low	transition	probabilities	in	synaptic	exocytosis	implies	that	there	exists	an	activation	barrier	against	the	opening	of	an	ion	channel	in	the	presynaptic	vesicular	grid.	Hiley	and	Pylkkänen	(2005:	21-2)	suggested	that	it	is	the	action	of	the	quantum	potential	that	effectively	reduces	the	height	of	the	potential	barrier	to	increase	the	probability	of	exocytosis	(this	is	an	example	of	quantum	tunneling).		In	the	extended	ontological	interpretation	the	higher	order	“mental”	fields	can	then	in	a	natural	way	influence	the	quantum	potential	and	in	this	way	control	synaptic	exocytosis.		Quantum	tunneling	in	synaptic	communication	has	recently	been	discussed	in	detail	by	Danko	Georgiev	(2018)	and	I	suggest	that	a	promising	way	to	develop	Bohmian	quantum	brain	theory	further	is	to	examine	Georgiev’s	proposals	in	the	light	of	the	richer	picture	of	quantum	processes	that	the	ontological	interpretation	provides.	Another	possibility	is	to	apply	the	Bohm	scheme	to	recent	proposals	that	quantum	coherence	is	involved	in	ion	channel	conductivity	and	selectivity	(Salari	et	al.	2017).	By	controlling	the	quantum	potential	in	the	ion	channels,	the	higher-order	mental	fields	might	then	be	able	to	control	the	triggering	of	action	potentials.	Such	speculations	require	a	careful	consideration	of	the	problem	of	decoherence.		 Alternatively,	one	might	look	in	the	light	of	the	ontological	interpretation	at	Penrose	and	Hameroff’s	proposal	that	consciousness	depends	on	biologically	
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“orchestrated”	coherent	quantum	processes	in	collections	of	microtubules	within	brain	neurons.	Penrose	and	Hameroff	(unlike	Bohm	and	Hiley)	give	high	importance	to	the	role	of	the	orchestrated	objective	reduction	(collapse)	of	the	quantum	state	in	the	regulation	of	axonal	firings	and	the	control	of	conscious	behavior	(see	Hameroff	and	Penrose	2014).		In	the	ontological	interpretation	such	regulation	would	take	place	through	the	higher-order	“mental”	fields	orchestrating	the	quantum	potential	(which	need	not	involve	collapse).	Let	us	summarize	Bohmian	mental	causation.	The	Bohm-Hiley	scheme	gives	a	key	causal	role	to	information	at	the	quantum	level,	by	suggesting	that	information	about	the	environment	of	the	quantum	particles	is	encoded	in	the	wave	function	and	guides	the	particles.		It	is	reasonable	to	postulate	a	hierarchy	
of	fields	of	information	in	complex	systems	such	as	brains.	If	free	will	and	spontaneity	is	possible	at	the	higher	levels	of	information,	then	the	hierarchy	enables	free	will	to	guide	physical	action.	The	principle	of	the	causal	closure	of	the	physical	domain	needs	to	be	abandoned	or	else	modified	to	include	(traditionally	non-physical)	causal	features	such	as	information	(for	a	more	thorough	discussion,	see	Pylkkänen	2007;	2017).		
5.	Conclusion:	two	kinds	of	mental	causation,	contra	the	received	
view	of	physicalism		In	this	paper	we	first	considered	how	causal	anti-fundamentalism	suggests	a	possible	route	to	mental	causation.	According	to	causal	anti-fundamentalism	the	physical	world	is	not	governed	by	any	fundamental	relation	of	cause	and	effect.	But	it	typically	assumes	that	fundamental	physical	facts	ground	causal	facts,	including	those	involving	consciousness.	Conscious	experiences	can	then	be	seen	as	local	events	which	determine	events	in	their	future.	We	also	saw	that	there	are	reasons	to	think	that	causal	anti-fundamentalism	is	incorrect.		But	we	noted	that	there	is	another	way	to	challenge	the	received	view,	namely	by	making	use	of	the	ontological	interpretation	of	quantum	theory.	This	interpretation	suggests	that	information	plays	a	fundamental	causal	role	in	the	physical	world.	We	argued	that	it	is	reasonable	to	assume	that	there	exists	a	hierarchy	of	levels	of	information,	with	two-way	causal	influences	between	
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levels.	Mental/conscious	states	are	part	of	this	hierarchy	and	can	thus	causally	affect	and	be	affected	by	physical	processes	at	lower	levels	of	the	hierarchy.		 In	this	short	paper	our	discussion	has	been	schematic,	and	many	of	the	issues	need	to	be	explored	more	carefully	in	later	research.		For	example,	how	to	reconcile	the	suggestion	that	causality	can	be	eliminated	in	classical	physics,	with	the	suggestion	that	it	cannot	be	eliminated	in	(usual)	quantum	mechanics	(and	possibly	in	the	Bohm-Hiley	theory)?	Further,	the	Bohm-Hiley	theory	is	non-local,	so	what	is	the	role	of	causality	in	those	situations	where	a	non-local	quantum	potential	has	a	non-negligible	effect	(e.g.	an	EPR-type	experiment;	cf.	Fenton-Glynn	and	Kroedel	2015;	Walleczek	2016;	Musser	2015)?				
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